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Abstract
Examining the authenticity of images has become in-
creasingly important as manipulation tools become more
accessible and advanced. Recent work has shown that
while CNN-based image manipulation detectors can suc-
cessfully identify manipulations, they are also vulnera-
ble to adversarial attacks, ranging from simple double
JPEG compression to advanced pixel-based perturbation.
Rephrase(hailey): In this paper we explore another method
of highly plausible attack: printing and scanning. We
demonstrate the vulnerability of two state-of-the-art mod-
els to this type of attack. We also propose a new machine
learning model that performs comparably to these state-
of-the-art models when trained and validated on printed
and scanned images. Of the three models, our proposed
model performs the best when trained and validated on im-
ages from a single printer. To facilitate this exploration, we
create a dataset of over 6,000 printed and scanned image
blocks. Further analysis suggests that variation between
images produced from different printers is significant, large
enough that good validation accuracy on images from one
printer does not imply similar validation accuracy on im-
ages from a different printer.
1. Introduction
Determining the authenticity of an image is becoming in-
creasingly important for legal proceedings, criminal inves-
tigations, and verifying identity-supporting documents. In
recent years, Convolutional Neural Networks have been em-
ployed to detect image manipulations, ranging from iden-
tifying splicing and copy-move forgeries [30] to manipu-
lations such as contrast enhancement [32, 38], resampling
[28], JPEG compression [14], Gaussian blurring [19, 4],
median filtering [5], and additive white Gaussian noise [2].
Of this latter group, some may be innocuously applied but
often are maliciously included in post-processing to dis-
guise other manipulations [6], .
More recently, research in image forensics has included
the presence of an adversary, a situation in which the vul-
nerability of CNNs has been well-studied [7]. In regards
to image forensics, consideration of these adversarial at-
tacks have been primarily limited to pixel-based adversarial
examples and JPEG double compression[1, 31]. In pixel-
based attacks, an adversary with knowledge of the CNN
model in deployment can craft an ”attacked” image which
appears visually identical to the original image, but is mis-
labeled by the CNN [16]. This problem is well known in
computer vision and has been at the forefront of recent work
in field. However, this type of attack demands a certain level
of expertise by the adversary, and is unlikely to be employed
in a majority of cases in image forensics. Even for skilled
adversaries, constructing pixel-based adversarial attacks is
often labor-intensive, and recent work has cast doubt on the
transferability of adversarial attacks in image forensics ap-
plications [18]. While pixel-based adversarial attacks re-
quire at least some knowledge of the model, a low-level
adversarial manipulation such as double JPEG compres-
sion requires no such knowledge[1]. In this type of attack,
the images are simply JPEG compressed after the manip-
ulation has been applied, hampering the model’s ability to
correctly identify post-processing methods such as additive
white Gaussian noise or median filtering [1]. For this rea-
son, building models robust to low-level, simple adversarial
manipulations such as JPEG double compression, to which
several manipulation detection models have been found to
be vulnerable [1, 31, 1], is particularly important. The goal
of this paper is to investigate the vulnerability of state of
the art models to another kind of low-level adversarial ma-
nipulation: printing and scanning. To our knowledge this is
the first investigation into adversarial attack in digital image
manipulations through printing and scanning.
In physical forgery, repeated printing and scanning can
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Figure 1. Pristine image before (left) and after (right) printing and scanning on Xerox1 (Xerox Altalink C8070 Multifunction Printer). We
note that there is significant variation between the two images, similar to that introduced by the global manipulation methods with which
we experimented.
be used to obscure manipulations or watermarks. A docu-
ment may be modified, usually non-digitally, and then re-
peatedly printed and scanned to disguise the manipulation
artifacts. While scanning a printed document is not always
related to forgery, it is reasonable to expect that state-of-the-
art models be impervious to this type of post-processing,
as is noted in related work in double JPEG compression
[1, 14]. In addition, unlike complex pixel-based adversar-
ial attacks, simply printing and scanning an image is both
low-cost and requires little expertise, similar to JPEG com-
pression.
In this paper, we limit our investigation to globally-
applied manipulations, such as Gaussian blurring, additive
white Gaussian noise, and median filtering, rather than local
manipulations such as copy-move or splicing, as in related
work [2]. We construct printed and scanned datasets from
three different printers and experiment with two state-of-
the-art models, as well as our own novel model. Related to
our work is research involved in identifying camera models
[37] – we additionally report results for identifying printer
model. Our main contributions include the following:
• We conduct the first analysis into the vulnerability of
image manipulation detectors to printing and scanning,
demonstrating that at least two state-of-the-art models
are vulnerable to this type of highly plausible and in-
expensive attack
• We propose a novel model architecture which per-
forms comparably than the state-of-the-art models
when trained and evaluated on printed and scanned im-
ages, including performing 5% better when trained on
images from a single printer
• We conduct an in-depth analysis on the relationship
between CNN-based image manipulation detectors, in-
cluding training on composite datasets, and plan to
share our dataset of over 6,000 printed and scanned
images with the community to facilitate further inves-
tigation
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we give context and background through related work. In
Section 3, we describe our novel model architecture, as well
as those of the models we used for comparison. In Section
4, we describe the datasets used for training and validation.
In Section 5, we explain the experiments conducted, and in
Section 6, we discuss the results of these experiments. The
paper ends in Section 7, where we summarize our conclu-
sions and suggest areas of future research.
2. Related Work
As the scope of this paper is limited to CNN-based global
image manipulation detectors, we provide background on
convolutional neural networks and CNN-based detectors.
We similarly provide context on adversarial attacks on
CNNs generally as well as specifically on CNN-based im-
age manipulation detectors. Related to this work is work on
detecting manipulations through inconsistencies in lighting
[20] and despite various compression qualities [13]. [20]
contributes significantly to this problem area, though with-
out examining models that leverage deep learning. [13] sim-
ilarly advances the area, but without addressing specifically
the problem of printing and scanning in relation to CNN-
based detectors, and is thus complementary to this work.
2.1. Convolutional Neural Networks
Convolutional neural networks, and deep learning ap-
proaches more generally, are an extension of neural net-
Figure 2. Examples of manipulations before and after printing and scanning. The six manipulations refer to additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN), Gaussian blurring (GB), JPEG compression (JPEG), median filtering (MF), pristine or no manipulation (PR) and bilinear
resampling (RS). We note that due to the algorithms employed, JPEG compression and resampling might be reasonably similar to the
printing and scanning process. For this reason, we additionally train and evaluate the models on a restricted set of four classes only,
excluding JPEG and bilinear resampling. See Table 2 for details on the parameters used for each manipulation.
works. The architecture is defined by a set of parameters
used to design the network and generally consists of stacked
layers. This approach has proven effective in extracting
higher-order features, particularly in object identification,
but recent work has also demonstrated that these types of
networks, with some modifications, are also useful for ex-
tracting the low level features useful for detecting global
image manipulations. In a Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN), the first layer is a set of convolutional feature ex-
tractors that convolve across the image in parallel using a set
of learnable filters. The filters are initialized randomly, and
the values are updated iteratively through back-propagation
[22, 23]. The filters use a sliding window approach to reach
all regions of the input image, producing feature maps. The
following hidden layers function similarly, convolving over
the resulting feature maps to produce higher-level feature
maps. Each convolutional layer is followed by an activa-
tion function to provide non-linearity. Additionally, convo-
lutional layers are often followed by pooling layers (max,
average, stochastic, etc) to reduce the dimensionality of the
resulting features and reduce over-fitting. The output of the
final convolutional layer is inputted into a fully-connected
neural network for classification.
2.2. Deep Learning for Image Forensics
Recent methods in image forensics techniques leverag-
ing deep learning have reached impressive performance. In
2015, a CNN-based classifier was proposed for detecting
median filtering in images [8]. Building on this work, [2]
proposed CNN-based model with the addition of a ”con-
strained convolutional layer”, or a layer constrained to learn
the high-pass features of an image by attempting to predict
a central pixel based on its neighbors. This serves to sup-
press the image content while learning the manipulation fin-
gerprint, drawing inspiration from steganalysis rich model
(SRM) filters in steganalysis [15].
More recently, it has been shown that third order subtrac-
tive pixel analysis matrix (S3SPAM) features can be learned
by a simple shallow CNN, and can employ transfer learning
to achieve good performance on little training data [12]. In
addition to directly detecting manipulations, a deep learning
method for analyzing the image processing history as an im-
portant component for image forensics has been proposed,
as the processing history pipeline can affect the accuracy of
other forensic tools [3].
2.3. Adversarial Attacks on CNNs
The vulnerability of CNNs to adversarial attacks has
been well documented [16, 26]. Adversarial noise can be
designed in such a way that, when added to the image, can
retain visual quality while misleading the classifier. For
example, Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [16] lever-
ages the differentiability of the loss function, assumed to
be known to the adversary. The method proposes altering
each pixel based on the gradient of the loss with respect
to the original pixels in the input image. These changes
small are enough such that the resulting image is visually
nearly identical to the original, but are large enough cumu-
Table 1. Descriptions and sizes of each dataset used for training and validation. Size refers to the number of 256x256 or 299x299 image
blocks in each dataset, which is then split in 75% training and 25% validation. X1 and X2 refer to Xerox1 and Xerox2 printers (Section
4.1), respectively. The labels refer to the labels used when training and evaluating on each dataset
Dataset Name Description Size Labels
Original IFSTC dataset after six manipulations 198,624
awgn, gb, mf,
pr (jpeg), (rs)
Xerox1
Images from IFSTC dataset with
manipulations after being printed
and scanned on Xerox1
2,142
awgn, gb, mf,
pr (jpeg), (rs)
Composite Printers Combined set of images from each printer (balanced) 6,426
awgn, gb, mf,
pr (jpeg), (rs)
Composite Full
Combined set of images from each
printer plus original IFSTC images (balanced) 8,568
awgn, gb, mf,
pr (jpeg), (rs)
Printer Identification Pristine images after being printed and scanned by all three printers 3,213 Dell, X1, X2
JPEG Compression IFSTC dataset with JPEG compression (QF=80) on all images 198,624
awgn, gb, mf,
pr (jpeg), (rs)
latively to increase the loss such as to impair the classifica-
tion. Similarly, projected gradient descent (PGD) [24] seeks
a perturbation that maximises the loss on a specific input
while keeping the perturbation size smaller than a given ep-
silon. DeepFool [25] uses a local linearization of the classi-
fier to approximate the decision boundary and alter the im-
ages accordingly. The Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
(JSMA) [26] uses a greedy iterative procedure, altering only
the pixels which contribute most to the correct classification
as identified by a saliency map. Each of these pixel-based
adversarial attacks, while effective, requires at least partial
knowledge of the network used for image manipulation de-
tection. In contrast, low-level adversarial attacks such as
JPEG compression or printing and scanning, the subject of
this paper, require no such knowledge.
2.4. Adversarial Attacks in Image Forensics
While CNN-based classifiers have achieved high per-
formance on benchmark image forensic tasks, recent re-
search in computer vision has demonstrated that CNN-
based detectors, like CNNs more broadly, are highly vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks. For example, in [21], the au-
thors demonstrate that a GAN-based architecture can con-
ceal 3x3 median filtering manipulation, causing a detector
to label the image as non-manipulated, including for the
CNN-based detectors proposed in [2] and [9]. Additionally,
a method of adversarial attack based on small pixel-based
distortions has been proposed for fooling global image ma-
nipulation detectors [35]. However, [36] notes that unlike in
most pattern recognition tasks, pixel-based adversarial at-
tacks such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [17] and
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [27], are not
for the most part transferable between models.
Recent work has explored the vulnerability of image ma-
nipulation detectors to low-resolution median filtering [34]
and JPEG compression [1, 31, 10]. To our knowledge, ours
is the first paper to examine model vulnerability to printing
and scanning.
3. Models
Here we describe our proposed model architecture for
improved performance on printed and scanned images. We
compare our model to the model proposed in [2], the in-
spiration for the constrained convolutional layer, as well as
to XceptionNet (Xception) [11], as they have nearly iden-
tical number of parameters and similar architecture, so the
difference in performance cannot be attributed to increased
network capacity.
3.1. Proposed Model
Our proposed architecture consists of one constrained
convolutional layer [2], 1 convolutional layer, 34 separa-
ble convolutional layers, 5 pooling layers (4 max pooling,
1 global average pooling), and a final fully connected layer
(see Figure 3). Each convolutional layer was followed by
ReLU activation, and max pooling layers were performed
with a stride of 2x2.
In the constrained convolutional layer, a 5x5 filter is em-
ployed in which the sum of all the weights is constrained
to be zero [2]. Specifically, the center pixel is predicted by
the rest of the pixels in the field, and the output of the filter
can be interpreted as the prediction error, as suggested by
research in steganalysis [3]. Specifically, the weights in the
filter are constrained such that:{
w(0, 0) = −1∑
l,m6=0 w(l,m) = 1
where w refers to the weight, and l and m refer to the coor-
dinates in the filter, where 0, 0 is the central weight.
The purpose of the constrained convolutional layer is
to constrain the model to learn image manipulation finger-
Figure 3. Proposed network architecture. The first layer is a constrained convolutional layer to extract SRM features, followed by an deep
architecture with separable convolutional layers to improve generalization. The last layer is either a 4x1 vector (for four classes) or a 6x1
vector (for all six classes).
prints, rather than image content and higher order features,
such as those useful for object recognition and classification
tasks. The prediction error fields are then used as low-level
forensic trace features by the rest of the network to assist in
classifying global image manipulation detection.
For the separable convolutional layers, a spatial convo-
lution is performed independently for each channel and is
followed by a point-wise or 1x1 convolution, as proposed
in [11]. These components decrease the number of free pa-
rameters allowing the deep network to learn effectively even
with a small training set, making it particularly appropriate
for our investigation.
In this approach, we hope to leverage both the SRM-
like features produced by the convolutional layer as well as
the improved generalization ability provided by the added
depth and separable layers.
3.2. Bayar2016
Proposed in 2016, the constrained convolution method
of image manipulation detection, hereafter referred to at
Bayar2016, proposes a three-layer CNN, with two max-
pooling layers and three fully-connected layers (includ-
ing the initial constrained convolutional layer) [2]. This
model demonstrated impressive results in discerning be-
tween the six manipulations investigated in this paper using
the dataset described in the next section, achieving 99.9%
validation accuracy.
3.3. Xception
In addition to a the Bayar2016 shallow network, recent
work has demonstrated that increasing network depth can
dramatically improve model generalization. To compare
with a model of similar depth that also uses separable con-
volutional layers, we experiment with XceptionNet, a deep
network comprising of 42 layers, including separable con-
Manipulation Hyperparameters
Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) σ = 2.0
Gaussian Blurring (GB)
kernal size = (5,5)
σ = 1.1
JPEG compression (JPEG) quality = 70
Median Filtering (MF) kernal size = (5,5)
Pristine (PR) none
Bilinear Resampling (RS) ratio = 1.5
Table 2. Parameter specifications for each manipulation type. We
used the same parameters as in [2] for fair comparison. See Sec-
tion 4.2 for details on the manipulations.
volutional layers [11]. The network design is built upon In-
ception architecture [33], with the innovation of separable
filters.
4. Datasets
Following the procedure described in [2], we use images
from the first IEEE IFSTC Image Forensics Challenge [29],
obtaining 3,334 images of size 1024x768, which was fur-
ther split into training, validation and testing data. The
dataset comprises of many images captured from several
different digital cameras of both indoor and outdoor scenes.
4.1. Printing and Scanning
We used three different printers and one scanner to cre-
ate a dataset of printed and scanned images: one Dell
S3845CDN Laser Multifunction Printer, one Xerox Al-
talink C8070 Multifunction Printer, and one Xerox Work-
Centre 7970 Multifunction Printer, which we refer to as
Dell, Xerox1 and Xerox2 respectively hereafter. We printed
50 images of each manipulation type on each printer and
used the Dell scanner to scan each image (see Figure 1).
After scanning and extracting the images from the resulting
pdfs, the image sizes were 1700 x 2200 pixels, which was
then center-cropped to 1536 x 1792 to remove the white
border added by the scanning process. Each image was
then split into 42 256x256 blocks (or 299x299 blocks for
our proposed model and for Xception), resulting in 2,142
image blocks of each class from each printer (see Figure
2). We limited our data creation to 900 full-page color
images both for budget constraints and environmental con-
cerns, thus presenting synthetic printing and scanning sim-
ulation as an avenue of possible future work.
4.2. Manipulations
We post-processed each image with additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN), Gaussian blurring (GB), JPEG com-
pression (JPEG), median filtering (MF) and re-sampling
(RS) as well as retaining the pristine image (PR), yielding
six classes, per the procedure described in [2].
Additive white Gaussian noise constructs a noise matrix
of the same shape as the image according to a normal dis-
tribution with a given sigma value and adds this matrix to
the original image. The result is then normalized to values
between 0 and 255. Gaussian blurring blurs the image us-
ing a Gaussian filter by convolving the input image using
a given kernal. JPEG compression is a lossy compression
method which compresses the image through converting the
color map, down-sampling and Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT). Median filtering replaces each pixel with the me-
dian value of the neighboring pixels using a given kernal
area. Bilinear resampling works similarly, resizing the im-
age using the distance-weighted average of the neighboring
pixels to estimate the new pixel value. See Table 2 for pa-
rameter details.
5. Experiments
We trained each model (our proposed model, Bayar2016,
and Xception) on a variety of training sets and evaluated
each trained model on a variety of validation datasets (See
Table 1).
We first evaluated the extent to which our selected mod-
els can correctly classify the validation images after printing
and scanning. We trained each model on the original dataset
(before printing and scanning) with all six classes: addi-
tive white gaussian noise (AWGN), gaussian blurring (GB),
JPEG compression (JPEG), median filtering (MF), bilinear
resampling (RS) and pristine or no manipulation (PR). For
a more complete analysis, we removed the bilinear resam-
pling (RS) and JPEG compression (JPEG) classes from the
training and validations sets and retrained the models, as
these two classes could intuitively be considered similar to
changes introduced during the printing and scanning pro-
cess (see Table 3).
Second, we explored countering this vulnerability by
training on the printed and scanned image blocks [17]. We
trained each model on the printed and scanned image blocks
from a single printer. The dataset (see Table 1, Xerox1)
consists of 50 full images (1700 x 2200 pixels), which
were then divided into 256x256 for the Bayar2016 model
or 299x299 for the Xception models. This resulted in 2,142
image blocks for each dataset, which was divided into train-
ing and validation sets of size 1722 and 420 respectively,
using only the central images to avoid including border ar-
tifacts from the scanning process.
Third, we created composite datasets, one consisting of
all printed and scanned image blocks (from all three print-
ers), and the other consisting of all printed and scanned
image blocks as well as a number of image blocks from
the original dataset (before printing and scanning), at a size
equivalent to those from one of the three printers. The first
composite dataset, which we refer to as Composite Print-
ers, consists of 6,426 image blocks (printed and scanned
only), while the second consists of 8,568 image blocks
(75% printed and scanned, 25% original). The goal of this
experiment was to evaluate if the poor accuracy fitting the
printed and scanned data could be mitigated by dramatically
increasing the size of the training set.
Finally, we evaluated the performance of each of the
models on identifying the printer of printed and scanned im-
ages (see Table 1, Printer Identification).
For Bayar2016, we used a batch size of 64, an initial
learning rate of 0.01, Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
with momentum 0.95, weight decay 0.0005, gamma 0.7,
and step size 6.
We used similar hyperparameters for Xception and our
proposed model. Specifically, for both models, we use the
pre-trained weights from the network as trained on Ima-
geNet. We again used SGD, and inferred the batch size and
learning rate at training time based on the number of GPUs,
using
batch size = 4× num gpus
for the batch size and 0.01 for the initial learning rate. We
use momentum 0.9 and weight decay 0.0005. For learning
rate decay, we use polynomial decay as described in [39].
For each model, we trained until the validation accuracy
plateaued or began to fall.
Following the original methodology for Bayar2016, we
retain only the green color layer of each image and divide
into 256x256 non-overlapping blocks, retaining nine central
blocks. For our proposed model and for Xception, we retain
all three color channels and split the images into 299x299
non-overlapping blocks, according to the input size of the
original architecture.
Table 3. Validation accuracy for various validation sets after train-
ing on IFSTC dataset. We note that although all three models per-
form exceptionally well on the original IFSTC dataset, each per-
forms little better than random when evaluated on images from
any of the three printers. Because JPEG compression and bilinear
resampling could be reasonably inferred to be similar to printing
and scanning, we remove these classes and train and evaluate on
a restricted set of four classes (4c) (See Section 5). Despite this
restricted set of manipulations, however, the models perform no
better than random.
Bayar2016 Xception
Proposed
Model
Original (6c) 0.9979 0.9916 0.993
Dell (6c) 0.1643 0.1632 0.1673
Xerox1 (6c) 0.1976 0.201 0.1827
Xerox2 (6c) 0.1972 0.202 0.1953
Original (4c) 0.9948 0.9954 0.997
Dell (4c) 0.2571 0.223 0.2347
Xerox1 (4c) 0.2411 0.246 0.2367
Xerox2 (4c) 0.2387 0.255 0.2393
JPEG (4c) 0.4255 0.5126 0.4825
6. Results and Discussion
6.1. Print-Scan Manipulation
To evaluate the general vulnerability of each of the mod-
els to printed and scanned images, we trained on the origi-
nal IFSTC dataset (before printing and scanning) and eval-
uated each model on validation sets from each of the three
printers. When we evaluated the models on the printed
and scanned validation sets, we found that each model per-
formed only slightly better than random.
We additionally removed the bilinear resampling and
JPEG compression classes, and found that the resulting
models are similarly unable to correctly classify the remain-
ing four manipulations, still performing at or below random.
We additionally note that the models perform worse on the
printed and scanned validation images than on the valida-
tion images after JPEG compression, a known vulnerability
of these types of models, indicating that printing and scan-
ning may be more effective at masking the manipulations
[13] (see Table 3).
6.2. Cross-Training on Printed and Scanned Exam-
ples
We additionally trained each model on printed and
scanned images from an individual printer (Xerox1) (See
Section 4.1).
We note that Bayar2016 and Xception achieve accura-
cies 66.6% and 70.4% respectively, while our proposed
model is able to achieve an accuracy of 75.3%. It also ap-
pears that training on one printer does not lend itself to sim-
ilar validation accuracy on examples from another printer,
Table 4. Validation accuracy for various validation sets after train-
ing on Xerox1 dataset (see Table 1, Xerox1). We trained each
model on images from only the Xerox1 dataset, or images after
being printed and scanned on the first Xerox printer. We find that
while no model is able to perfectly fit the printed and scanned
dataset, our proposed models significantly outperforms the current
state-of-the-art models. We also note that transferability to other
printers remains weak, indicating significant variance between the
printers. Here 4c indicates that we used the restricted set of ma-
nipulations (AWGN, GB, MF, and PR) (See Section 5).
Bayar2016 Xception
Proposed
Model
Xerox1 (4c) 0.7036 0.666 0.753
Dell (4c) 0.3018 0.482 0.456
Original (4c) 0.2342 0.3873 0.3649
Xeros2 (4c) 0.4738 0.611 0.572
JPEG (4c) 0.2418 0.3848 0.364
Table 5. Validation accuracy for various validation sets after train-
ing on the Composite Printers dataset. One possible explanation
for the poor validation accuracy on a single printer could be the
small size of the dataset. To investigate this, we combine the im-
ages from all three printers for training, but note that performance
on a single printer does not improve. Here 4c indicates that we
used the restricted set of manipulations (AWGN, GB, MF, and PR)
(See Section 5).
Bayar2016 Xception
Proposed
Model
Dell (4c) 0.6506 0.649 0.713
Xerox1 (4c) 0.7001 0.626 0.683
Xeros2 (4c) 0.5381 0.623 0.663
JPEG (4c) 0.2643 0.2902 0.2601
Original (4c) 0.2617 0.2847 0.2449
Table 6. Validation accuracy for various validation sets after train-
ing on the Composite Printers dataset. For a complete analysis, we
add additional image blocks (blocks before printing and scanning)
to the composite dataset, but again find that performance does not
improve. Here 4c indicates that we used the restricted set of ma-
nipulations (AWGN, GB, MF, and PR) (See Section 5).
Bayar2016 Xception
Proposed
Model
Dell (4c) 0.6339 0.662 0.654
Xerox1 (4c) 0.6982 0.632 0.674
Xerox2 (4c) 0.5637 0.602 0.696
JPEG (4c) 0.519 0.6374 0.4972
Original (4c) 0.8063 0.0.9259 0.9629
Table 7. Validation accuracy for printer identification by model.
We investigate the variation of the images between printers by
training each model to discern between printers. The high accu-
racy indicates that the images produces by each printer vary sig-
nificantly.
Bayar2016 Xception
Proposed
Model
Printer
Identification 0.9048 0.956 0.9533
even of the same make. (See Table 4).
6.3. Composite Training
To compensate for the small size of the dataset for each
printer alone, we created a composite dataset, consisting of
all of the printed and scanned examples (total size 6,426
blocks), which we refer to as Composite Printers. How-
ever, we found that training on this composite dataset did
not improve validation performance on any single printer
compared with training on images from that printer alone.
While this is possibly due to a still insufficiently large train-
ing dataset, it also likely provides further evidence that the
difference between printers and scanners may be significant
enough to preclude fitting a general printed and scanned
dataset (see Table 5).
For completion, we additionally created another com-
posite dataset, which we refer to as Composite Full, which
consists of the same composition as Composite Printers plus
an equivalent number of examples from the original dataset
(total size 8,568), and found similar results. (See Table 6).
6.4. Printer Identification
For comparison with work on camera model identifica-
tion, we additionally experimented with printer identifica-
tion on each of the three printers using the discussed mod-
els, and found that the models could distinguish between
images from the printers with up to 95% accuracy. This
is particularly impressive considering the accuracies were
achieved using a relatively small set of training data (2,410
image blocks) and without any additional metadata (see Ta-
ble 7), indicating significant variance between the artifacts
introduced by each printer [37].
7. Summary
We investigated the robustness of current state-of-the-
art image manipulation detection models in the context of
printing and scanning, and found that these state-of-the-
art models perform poorly on printed and scanned image
data. We proposed our own novel model architecture, which
performs 5% better than the state-of-the-art models when
trained and evaluated on images from a single printer. We
constructed a dataset of over 6,000 printed and scanned im-
age blocks which we plan to release to the community for
further investigation.
That current state-of-the-art models are vulnerable to
printing and scanning is an important finding given the
availability and ease of printing and scanning images ver-
sus constructing complex adversarial examples.
Further analysis suggest that the variability between im-
ages produced by each printer is large, significant enough
for the models to easily distinguish between printers and
for models trained on a single printer to generalize poorly
Figure 4. Confusion matrix for Bayar2016 trained on Original IF-
STC, evaluated on Xerox1 (see Table 1, Xerox1). We note that de-
spite the high reported validation accuracy on the original dataset,
the model struggles to distinguish between the classes after print-
ing and scanning.
Figure 5. Confusion matrix for Bayar2016 trained on Original IF-
STC (without RS and JPEG), evaluated on Xerox1 (See Table 1).
We investigate the model’s performance after removing bilinear
resampling and JPEG compression, but find that it still performs
little better than random.
to images from another printer. This conclusion may create
additional challenges in designing models robust to print-
ing and scanning, and sets it apart from work on creating
models robust to more uniform and predictable JPEG com-
pression. Future work may include developing methods to
simulate printing and scanning in order to create a larger
datasets for training the models.
References
[1] M. Barni, A. Costanzo, E. Nowroozi, and B. Tondi. Cnn-
based detection of generic contrast adjustment with jpeg
post-processing. 2018 25th IEEE International Conference
on Image Processing (ICIP), Oct 2018. 1, 2, 4
[2] Belhassen Bayar and Matthew C. Stamm. A deep learning
approach to universal image manipulation detection using
a new convolutional layer. ACM Workshop on Information
Hiding and Multimedia Security, pages 5–10, 2016. 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6
[3] Mehdi Boroumand and Jessica J. Fridrich. Deep learning
for detecting processing history of images. In Media Water-
marking, Security, and Forensics, 2018. 3, 4
[4] Gang Cao, Yao Zhao, and Rongrong Ni. Edge-based blur
metric for tamper detection. Journal of Information Hiding
and Multimedia Signal Processing, 1(1):20–27, 2010. 1
[5] Gang Cao, Yao Zhao, Rongrong Ni, Lifang Yu, and Huawei
Tian. Forensic detection of median filtering in digital images.
In 2010 IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and
Expo, pages 89–94. IEEE, 2010. 1
[6] G. Cao, Y. Zhao, R. Ni, L. Yu, and H. Tian. Forensic detec-
tion of median filtering in digital images. In 2010 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Multimedia and Expo, pages 89–94,
2010. 1
[7] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Adversarial examples
are not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods. In
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelli-
gence and Security, pages 3–14, 2017. 1
[8] Jiansheng Chen, Xiangui Kang, Ye Liu, and Z. Wang. Me-
dian filtering forensics based on convolutional neural net-
works. Signal Processing Letters, IEEE, 22:1849–1853, 11
2015. 3
[9] Jiansheng Chen, Xiangui Kang, Ye Liu, and Z. Wang. Me-
dian filtering forensics based on convolutional neural net-
works. Signal Processing Letters, IEEE, 22:1849–1853, 11
2015. 4
[10] Yifang Chen, Xiangui Kang, Y.Q. Shi, and Z. Wang. A
multi-purpose image forensic method using densely con-
nected convolutional neural networks. Journal of Real-Time
Image Processing, 16, 03 2019. 4
[11] Francois Chollet. Xception: Deep learning with depthwise
separable convolutions. 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), Jul 2017. 4, 5
[12] Davide Cozzolino, Giovanni Poggi, and Luisa Verdoliva.
Recasting residual-based local descriptors as convolutional
neural networks. Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on
Information Hiding and Multimedia Security - IHMMSec 17,
2017. 3
[13] Mathieu Dejean-Servie`res, Karol Desnos, Kamel Abdeloua-
hab, Wassim Hamidouche, Luce Morin, and Maxime Pelcat.
Study of the impact of standard image compression tech-
niques on performance of image classification with a con-
volutional neural network. 2017. 2, 7
[14] Hany Farid. Exposing digital forgeries from jpeg ghosts.
IEEE transactions on information forensics and security,
4(1):154–160, 2009. 1, 2
[15] Jessica Fridrich and Jan Kodovsky. Rich models for steganal-
ysis of digital images. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, 7:868–882, 06 2012. 3
[16] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy.
Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014. 1, 3
[17] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy.
Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples, 2014. 4, 6
[18] Diego Gragnaniello, Francesco Marra, Giovanni Poggi, and
Luisa Verdoliva. Analysis of adversarial attacks against cnn-
based image forgery detectors. 2018 26th European Signal
Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), Sep 2018. 1
[19] Dun-Yu Hsiao and Soo-Chang Pei. Detecting digital tam-
pering by blur estimation. In First International Workshop
on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering
(SADFE’05), pages 264–278. IEEE, 2005. 1
[20] M. K. Johnson and H. Farid. Exposing digital forgeries in
complex lighting environments. IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Forensics and Security, 2(3):450–461, 2007. 2
[21] Dongkyu Kim, Han-Ul Jang, Seung-Min Mun, Sunghee
Choi, and Heung-Kyu Lee. Median filtered image restoration
and anti-forensics using adversarial networks. IEEE Signal
Processing Letters, 25:278–282, 2018. 4
[22] Yann LeCun, Bernhard Boser, John S Denker, Donnie
Henderson, Richard E Howard, Wayne Hubbard, and
Lawrence D Jackel. Backpropagation applied to handwrit-
ten zip code recognition. Neural computation, 1(4):541–551,
1989. 3
[23] Yann A LeCun, Le´on Bottou, Genevieve B Orr, and Klaus-
Robert Mu¨ller. Efficient backprop. In Neural networks:
Tricks of the trade, pages 9–48. Springer, 2012. 3
[24] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt,
Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. Towards deep learn-
ing models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1706.06083, 2017. 4
[25] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and
Pascal Frossard. Deepfool: a simple and accurate method to
fool deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE con-
ference on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages
2574–2582, 2016. 4
[26] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt
Fredrikson, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami. The
limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings. In 2016
IEEE European symposium on security and privacy (Eu-
roSP), pages 372–387. IEEE, 2016. 3, 4
[27] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt
Fredrikson, Z. Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami. The
limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings. 2016
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (Eu-
roSP), Mar 2016. 4
[28] Alin Popescu and Hany Farid. Exposing digital forgeries by
detecting traces of re-sampling. IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, 53:758–767, 02 2005. 1
[29] A.C. Popescu and H. Farid. Exposing digital forgeries by de-
tecting traces of resampling. Trans. Sig. Proc., 53(2):758767,
Feb. 2005. 5
[30] Y. Rao and J. Ni. A deep learning approach to detection of
splicing and copy-move forgeries in images. In 2016 IEEE
International Workshop on Information Forensics and Secu-
rity (WIFS), pages 1–6, 2016. 1
[31] Wuyang Shan, YaoHua Yi, JunYing Qiu, and AiGuo Yin.
Robust median filtering forensics using image deblocking
and filtered residual fusion. IEEE Access, PP:1–1, 01 2019.
1, 4
[32] Matthew Stamm and KJ Ray Liu. Blind forensics of contrast
enhancement in digital images. In 2008 15th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Image Processing, pages 3112–3115.
IEEE, 2008. 1
[33] Christian Szegedy, Wei Liu, Yangqing Jia, Pierre Sermanet,
Scott Reed, Dragomir Anguelov, Dumitru Erhan, Vincent
Vanhoucke, and Andrew Rabinovich. Going deeper with
convolutions, 2014. 5
[34] Hongshen Tang, Rongrong Ni, Yao Zhao, and Xiaolong Li.
Median filtering detection of small-size image based on cnn.
Journal of Visual Communication and Image Representation,
51:162 – 168, 2018. 4
[35] Benedetta Tondi. Pixel-domain adversarial examples against
cnn-based manipulation detectors. Electronics Letters, 54,
08 2018. 4
[36] Mauro Barni; Kassem Kallas; Ehsan Nowroozi; Benedetta
Tondi. On the transferability of adversarial examples against
cnn-based image forensics. 2020. 4
[37] Amel Tuama, Fre´de´ric Comby, and Marc Chaumont. Cam-
era model identification with the use of deep convolutional
neural networks. In 2016 IEEE International workshop on
information forensics and security (WIFS), pages 1–6. IEEE,
2016. 2, 8
[38] Pengpeng Yang, Rongrong Ni, Yao Zhao, Gang Cao,
Haorui Wu, and Wei Zhao. Robust contrast enhance-
ment forensics using convolutional neural networks. CoRR,
abs/1803.04749, 2018. 1
[39] Hengshuang Zhao, Jianping Shi, Xiaojuan Qi, Xiaogang
Wang, and Jiaya Jia. Pyramid scene parsing network. 2017
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recogni-
tion (CVPR), Jul 2017. 6
